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ABSTRACT
Ensuring safety and explainability of machine learning (ML) is a topic of increasing relevance as
data-driven applications venture into safety-critical application domains, traditionally committed to
high safety standards that are not satisfied with an exclusive testing approach of otherwise inaccessible
black-box systems. Especially the interaction between safety and security is a central challenge, as
security violations can lead to compromised safety. The contribution of this paper to addressing
both safety and security within a single concept of protection applicable during the operation of
ML systems is active monitoring of the behavior and the operational context of the data-driven
system based on distance measures of the Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF). We
investigate abstract datasets (XOR, Spiral, Circle) and current security-specific datasets for intrusion
detection (CICIDS2017) of simulated network traffic, using statistical distance measures including
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Kuiper, Anderson-Darling, Wasserstein and mixed Wasserstein-Anderson-
Darling measures. Our preliminary findings indicate that there is a meaningful correlation between
ML decisions and the ECDF-based distances measures of the input features. Thus, they can provide a
confidence level that can be used for a) analyzing the applicability of the ML system in a given field
(safety/security) and b) analyzing if the field data was maliciously manipulated1.
Keywords Safety · SafeML ·Machine Learning · Deep Learning · Artificial Intelligence · Statistical
Difference · Domain Adaptation
1Our preliminary code and results are available at https://github.com/ISorokos/SafeML
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1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) is expanding rapidly in numerous applications. In parallel with this rapid growth, the expansion
of ML towards dependability-critical applications raises societal concern regarding the reliability and safety assurance
of ML. For instance, ML in medicine by [1, 2, 3], in autonomous systems e.g. self-driving cars by [4, 5], in military
[6], and in economic applications by [7]. In addition, different organizations and governmental institutes are trying to
establish new rules, regulations and standards for ML, such as in [8, 9, 10].
While ML is a powerful tool for enabling data-driven applications, its unfettered use can pose risks to financial stability,
privacy, the environment and in some domains even life. Poor application of ML is typically characterized by poor
design, misspecification of the objective functions, implementation errors, choosing the wrong learning process, or
using poor or non-comprehensive datasets for training. Thus, safety for ML can be defined as a set of actions to
prevent any harm to humanity by ML failures or misuse. However, there are many perspectives and directions to be
defined for ML Safety. In fact, [11] have addressed different research problems of certifying ML systems operating in
the field. They have categorized safety issues into five categories: a) safe exploration, b) robustness to distributional
shift, c) avoiding negative side effects, d) avoiding “reward hacking” and “wire heading”, e) scalable oversight. This
categorization is helpful for an adequate assessment of the applicability a concept for a given (safety) problem. In the
work presented here, we will be focusing on addressing distributional shift, however using a non-standard interpretation.
Distributional shift is usually interpreted as the gradual deviation of the initial state of learning of an ML component
and its ongoing state as it performs online learning. As will be shown later, distributional shift will instead be used by
our approach to evaluate the distance between the training and observed data of an ML component.
Statistical distance measures can be considered as a common method to measure distributional shift. Furthermore,
in modern ML algorithms like Generative Adversarial Nets (GANs), statistical distance or divergence measures are
applied as a loss function, such as the Jensen-Shannon divergence [12], the Wasserstein distance [13], and the Cramer
distance [14]. For dimension reduction, the t-SNE (t-distributed stochastic neighbour embedding) algorithm uses the
Kullback-Leibler divergence as a loss function [15].
1.1 Contributions
This paper studies the applicability of safety-security monitoring based on statistical distance measures on the robustness
of ML systems in the field.The basis of this work is a modified version of the statistical distance concept to allow the
comparison of the data set during the ML training procedure and the observed data set during the use of the ML classifier
in the field. The calculation of the distance is carried out in a novel controller-in-the-loop procedure to estimate the
accuracy of the classifier in different scenarios. By exploiting the accuracy estimation, applications can actively identify
situations where the ML component may be operating far beyond its trained cases, thereby risking low accuracy, and
adjust accordingly. The main advantage of this approach is its flexibility in potentially handling a large range of ML
techniques, as it is not dependent on the ML approach. Instead, the approach focuses on the quality of the training data
and its deviation from the field data. In a comprehensive case study we have analyzed the possibilities and limitations
of the proposed approach.
1.2 Overview of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 1.3, previous work related to this publication is discussed. In
Section 2, the problem definition is provided. The proposed method is addressed in Section 3. Numerical results are
demonstrated in Section 4 with a brief discussion. Explainable AI is introduced and discussed as a highly relevant
topic in Section 5. The capabilities and limitations of the proposed method are summarised in Section 6 and the paper
terminates with a conclusion in Section 7.
1.3 Related Work
Our analysis of the research literature did not reveal any reference to existing publications dealing with the safety,
security and accuracy of ML-based classification using statistical measures of difference. Nevertheless, there are
publications that provide a basis for comparison with the current study. A Resampling Uncertainty Estimation (RUE)-
based algorithm has been proposed by [16] to ensure the point-wise reliability of the regression when the test or field
data set is different from the training dataset. The algorithm has created prediction ensembles through the modified
gradient and Hessian functions for ML-based regression problems. An uncertainty wrapper for black-box models based
on statistical measures has been proposed by [17]. Hobbhahn. M. et al. [18] have proposed a method to evaluate the
uncertainty of Bayesian Deep Networks classifiers using Dirichlet distributions. The results were promising but to a
limited class of classifiers (Bayesian Network-based classifiers). A new Key Performance Index (KPI), the Expected
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Figure 1: (a) A hypothetical measurement (i.e. from 0 to 100 is Class 1 and from 101 to 200 is Class 2) (b) The
estimated probability density function for both Class 1 and Class 2 with a classifier threshold equal to four
Odds Ratio (EOR) has been introduced in [23]. This KPI was designed to estimate empirical uncertainty in deep neural
networks based on entropy theories. However, this KPI has not yet been applied to other types of machine learning
algorithms. A comprehensive study on dataset shift has been provided by [19] and the dataset issues such as projection
and projectability, simple and prior probability shift are discussed there. However, the mentioned study does not address
the use of statistical distance and error bound to evaluate the dataset shift, in contrast to the work presented here.
2 Problem Definition
Classification ML algorithms are typically employed to categorize input samples into predetermined categories. For
instance, abnormality detection can be performed by detecting whether a given sample falls within known ranges i.e.
categories. A simple example of a classifier for 1-dimensional input can be a line or threshold. Consider a hypothetical
measurement t (e.g. time, temperature etc.) and a classifier D based on it, as shown in Figure 1-(a) and defined as (1).
Note that Figure 1 shows the true classes of the input.
D(t) =
{
Class1, if 0 < n ≤ 100
Class2, if 100 < n ≤ 200 (1)
The classifier D (t) can predict two classes which represent, in this example, the normal and abnormal state of a system.
From measurement input 0 to 100, the sample is considered to fall under class 1 and from above 100 to 200 under class 2.
The Probability Density Functions (PDFs) of the (true) classes can be estimated as shown in Figure 1-(b). In this figure,
the threshold of the classifier has been represented with a red vertical dash-line and value of four. The area with an
overlap in this figure can cause false detection to occur, as the classifier misclassifies the input belonging to the opposite
class. These type of misclassifications are also known as false positive/type I errors (e.g. when misclassifying input as
being class 1) and false-negative/type II errors (e.g. when misclassifying input as not being class 1). Considering Figure
1-(b) of probability density functions, we notice that in the area where the two probability density functions merge, the
misclassifications and thus the errors can occur. The probability of the error or misclassification can be calculated with
(2) [20]. Note that the error probability is also related to the threshold value (x considered as the threshold value), (for
more details see [21]).
P (error) =
∫ +∞
−∞
P (error|x)P (x) dx (2)
In listing (2), the P (error|x) can be calculated as the minimum of both PDFs as (3). The minimization is subject to
variation of threshold value from −∞ to +∞.
P (error|x) = min [P (Class 1|x) , P (Class 2|x)] (3)
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By dividing the space into two regions as R1 and R2, the probability of error can be written in two parts.
P (error) = P (x ∈ R1, Class 1) + P (x ∈ R2, Class 2)
=
∫
R1
P (x|Class 1)P (Class 1) dx+
∫
R2
P (x|Class 2)P (Class 2) dx (4)
To ease the minimization problem, consider the following inequality rule [22].
min [a, b] ≤ aλb1−λ where a, b ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (5)
Equation (3) can be rewritten as (6). Note that in (5) the ” ≤ ” can considered as ” = ” when we consider the worst-case
scenario or upper bound error.
P (error|x) = min [P (Class 1|x) , P (Class 2|x)] =
min
[
P (x|Class 1)P (Class 1)
P (x)
,
P (x|Class 2)P (Class 2)
P (x)
]
(6)
Using the inequality rule and equation (6), the conditional probability of error can be derived as (7).
P (error|x) ≤
(
P (x|Class 1)P (Class 1)
P (x)
)λ(
P (x|Class 2)P (Class 2)
P (x)
)1−λ
(7)
The equation (8) can be obtained using equations (2) and (7).
P (error) ≤ (P (Class 1))λ (P (Class 2))1−λ∫ +∞
−∞
(P (x|Class 1))λ (P (x|Class 2))1−λ dx
(8)
In safety assurance, it is important to consider the worst-case scenario which can lead us to (9), known as the Chernoff
upper bound of error [22].
P (error) = P (Class 1)
λ
P (Class 2)
1−λ∫ +∞
−∞
P (x|Class 1)λ P (x|Class 2)1−λ dx
(9)
If the probability distributions of the features obey normal or exponential distribution families, the integral part of (9)
can be solved through (10) [22].
∫ +∞
−∞
P (x|Class 1)λ P (x|Class 2)1−λ dx = e−θ(λ) (10)
The θ (λ) can be calculated using (11) where µ and Σ are mean vector and variance matrix of each class respectively.
θ (λ) =
λ (1− λ)
2
[µ2 − µ1]T [λΣ1 + (1− λ) Σ2]−1 [µ2 − µ1]
+0.5 log
|λΣ1 + (1− λ) Σ2|
|Σ1|λ |Σ2|(1−λ)
(11)
Considering α = 0.5 the equation (11) effectively becomes the Bhattacharyya distance. It can be proven that this value
is the optimal value when Σ1 = Σ2 [22, 25]. In this study, for simplicity, the Bhattacharyya distance will be used
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to demonstrate the approach. It should be noted that there may be cases where the calculated error bound is higher
than the real value. However, this is acceptable as an overestimation of the classifier error would not introduce safety
concerns (although it may impact performance). As the P (error) and P (correct) are complementary, the probability
of having a correct classification can be calculated using (12).
P (correct) = 1 −
√
P (Class 1)P (Class 2) e−θ(λ) (12)
The Chernoff upper bound of error is usually used as a measure of separability of two classes of data, but in the above
context, equation (12) measures the similarity between two classes. In other words, in an ideal situation, by comparing
the P (error) of a class, with itself, the response should be equal to one while P (correct) should be zero. The
intuitive explanation is to determine whether the distribution of the data during training is the same as the distribution
observed in the field (or not).
Assuming P (Class 1) = P (Class 2), the integral part of P (error) can be converted to the cumulative distribution
function as (13).
P (error) =
(∫ T
−∞
PClass 1 (x)dx+
∫ ∞
T
PClass 2 (x)dx
)
=
(∫ T
−∞
PClass 1 (x)dx+
∫ +∞
T
PClass 2 (x)dx
)
= (FClass 1 (T ) + (1− FClass 2 (T )))
= 1 − (FClass 2 (T )− FClass 1 (T ))
(13)
Equation (13) shows that there is relation between probability of error (and also accuracy) and statistical difference
between two Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) of two classes. Using this fact and considering that the Empirical
CDFs of each class is available, ECDF-based statistical measures such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (equation
14) and similar distance measures can be used [26, 27].
P (error) ≈ sup
x
(FClass 2 (x)− FClass 1 (x)) (14)
It should be mentioned that such ECDF-based distances are not bounded between zero and one and, in some cases, need
a coefficient to be adjusted as a measure for accuracy estimation. In section 4.3, the correlation between ECDF-based
distance and accuracy will be discussed.
3 SafeML Method
To begin with, we should note that while this study focuses on ML classifiers, the proposed approach does not prohibit
application on ML components for regression tasks either. Figure 2 illustrates how we envision the approach to be
applied practically. In this flowchart, there are two main sections; the training phase and the application phase. A)
The ’training’ phase is an offline procedure in which a trusted dataset is used to train the ML algorithm. Once training
is complete, the classifier’s performance is measured with user-defined KPIs. Meanwhile, the PDF and statistical
parameters of each class are also computed and stored for future comparison in the second phase. B) The second or
’application’ phase is an online procedure in which real-time and unlabelled data is provided to the system. For example,
consider an autonomous vehicle’s machine vision system. Such a system has been trained to detect obstacles (among
other tasks), so that the vehicle can avoid collisions with them. A critical issue to note in the application phase is that the
incoming data is unlabeled. So, it cannot be assured that the classifier will perform as accurately as it had in during the
training phase. As input samples are collected, the PDF and statistical parameters of each class can be estimated. The
system requires enough samples to reliably determine the statistical difference, so a buffer of samples may have to be
accumulated before proceeding. Using the modified Chernoff error bound in 12, the statistical difference of each class
in the training phase and application phase is compared. If the statistical difference is very low, the classifier results and
accuracy can be trusted. In the example mentioned above, the autonomous vehicle would continue its operation in this
case. Instead, if the statistical difference is greater, the classifier results and accuracy are no longer considered valid (as
the difference between the training and observed data is too large). In this case, the system should use an alternative
approach or notify a human operator. In the above example, the system could ask the driver to takeover control of the
vehicle.
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Figure 2: Flowchart of the proposed approach
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of XOR, Spiral and Circle Benchmarks
4 Case Studies
In this section, the proposed method described in Section 3 is applied on typical synthetic benchmarks for ML
classification. The proposed method has been implemented in three different programming languages including R,
Python and MATLAB. Regarding R programming, three well-known benchmarks have been selected: a) the XOR
dataset, b) the Spiral dataset and c) the Circle dataset. Each dataset has two features (i.e. input variables) and two
classes. Figure 3 illustrates the scatter plots of the selected benchmarks. More examples and benchmarks are available
at SafeML Github Repository.
4.1 Methodology for Evaluation against Benchmark Datasets
To start the ML-based classification, 80 percent of each dataset was used for training and testing and 20 percent of
the dataset has been used for validation, with 10-fold cross-validation. Both linear and nonlinear classifiers have been
selected for classification. The Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and the Classification And Regression Tree (CART)
are used as linear methods. Moreover, The Random Forest (RF), K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) are applied as nonlinear methods. As KPIs, the accuracy and Kappa measure are used to measure
the performance of each classifier. Finally, as Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF)-based statistical
distance measures, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance (KSD), Kuiper Distance, Anderson-Darling Distance (ADD),
Wasserstein Distance (WD), and a combination of ADD and Wasserstein-Anderson-Darling Distance (WAD) have been
selected for evaluation.
XOR Dataset: The XOR dataset has two features and two classes in which features have the same mean and variance
characteristics. Table 1 compares the estimated accuracy based on the ECDF measures with the Minimum True
Accuracy (MTA) and the Average True Accuracy (ATA) over 10 folds. For instance, the second column of this table
provides the estimated accuracy based on the KSD measure. As a matter of safety, MTA is more important because it
represents the worst-case scenarios, where the lowest accuracy may be experienced and impact safety. We observe that
the KSD measure reports low accuracy for the LDA classifier ( .77). Instead, the ADD and WAD measures significantly
overestimate the accuracy of the LDA.
Table 1: Comparison of estimated accuracies vs minimum true accuracy for XOR dataset
Method KSD Kuiper ADD WD WAD BD MTA ATA
LDA 0.772217 0.770600 0.902818 0.755064 0.985666 0.154506 0.50833 0.59121
CART 0.928179 0.921982 0.987722 0.92545 0.995211 0.497243 0.98744 0.99415
KNN 0.93057 0.913063 0.993151 0.958768 0.997076 0.497102 0.97489 0.98666
SVM 0.931045 0.917586 0.993489 0.95819 0.997064 0.496731 0.97916 0.98791
RF 0.92962 0.910749 0.992742 0.957821 0.997018 0.496856 0.99583 0.99833
Based on Table 1, Table 2 represents the (absolute) difference between accuracy estimations of each measure and the
MTA of each classifier. The ADD, WD and WAD measures have the best accuracy estimations overall. In particular,
when a LDA classifier is used, the WD measure provides an estimated accuracy with comparatively less error.
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Table 2: Difference between Distance Measures and MTA for XOR dataset
Method KSD Kuiper ADD WD WAD BD
LDA 0.263883 0.262267 0.394484 0.246731 0.477333 0.353828
CART 0.059269 0.065466 0.000274 0.06199 0.007763 0.490205
KNN 0.044320 0.061833 0.018256 0.016127 0.02218 0.477793
SVM 0.048122 0.061580 0.014322 0.020976 0.017897 0.482310
RF 0.066207 0.085084 0.003092 0.038012 0.001184 0.499102
Spiral Dataset: Similar to the XOR dataset, the proposed method can be applied for the spiral dataset. Table 3 presents
difference between ECDF-based distance measures and minimum true accuracy for this dataset. For brevity, for this
dataset and the next one, only the difference table is provided. Based on this table, the KSD and Kuiper distance have
better estimation for accuracy of the classifiers for the spiral dataset.
Table 3: Difference between Distance Measures and MTA for Spiral dataset
Method KSD Kuiper ADD WD WAD BD
LDA 0.099447 0.088252 0.269975 0.248396 0.528852 0.043445
CART 0.056131 0.031092 0.149191 0.09477 0.158529 0.355675
KNN 0.047526 0.075598 0.001468 0.014756 0.002734 0.496559
SVM 0.047526 0.075598 0.001468 0.014756 0.002734 0.496608
RF 0.024471 0.050261 0.018778 0.003885 0.019643 0.479893
Circle dataset: The circle dataset has similar statistical characteristics with the spiral dataset. Table 4 provides the
difference between ECDF-based distance measures and MTA for this dataset. As can be seen, the worst accuracy
estimation is related to the accuracy estimation of the LDA classifier. For the LDA, the Kuiper distance estimates with
less error, with the KSD and WD being in second and third place respectively.
Table 4: Difference between Distance Measures and MTA for Circle dataset
Method KSD Kuiper ADD WD WAD BD
LDA 0.329391 0.250345 0.412382 0.347450 0.49826 0.236670
CART 0.114312 0.019111 0.168596 0.099549 0.24322 0.455675
KNN 0.004833 0.037554 0.027649 0.010871 0.02775 0.498459
SVM 0.016133 0.043604 0.019147 0.001695 0.01935 0.498808
RF 0.004663 0.034529 0.027776 0.012814 0.02782 0.468893
4.2 Security dataset
This case-study applies the proposed method towards the CICIDS2017 dataset, which was originally produced by [30]
at the Canadian Institute for Cyber Security (CICS) as an aide to the development and research of anomaly-based
intrusion detection techniques for use in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs)
[31]. The labelled dataset includes both benign (Monday) and malicious (Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday)
activity. The benign network traffic is simulated by abstraction of typical user activity using a number of common
protocols such as HTTP, HTTPS, FTP and SHH. Benign and malicious network activity is included as packet payloads
in packet capture format (PCAPS).
Wednesday Attack: This attack occurred on Wednesday, July 5, 2017, and different types of attacks on the availability
of the victim’s system have been recorded, such as DoS / DDoS, DoS slowloris (9:47 – 10:10 a.m.), DoS Slowhttptest
(10:14 – 10:35 a.m.), DoS Hulk (10:43 – 11 a.m.), and DoS GoldenEye (11:10 – 11:23 a.m.). Regarding the cross-
validation, a hold-out approach has been used, in which 70 percent of data has been randomly extracted for testing
and training and the rest has been used for accuracy estimation. Additionally, traditional classifiers including ’Naive
Bayes’,’Discriminant Analysis’,’Classification Tree’, and ’Nearest Neighbor’ have been used. Figure 4 shows the
confusion matrix when Naive Bayes classifier is used.
Figure 5 has been generated over 100 iterations. For each iteration, 70 percent of the data has been randomly extracted
for testing and training and the rest has been used for accuracy estimation. Figure 5 shows the box plot of the statistical
distance measurements vs. the evaluated accuracy over 100 iterations. By observing the average values (red lines)
of each box plot, the relationship between each measure and the average change in accuracy can be understood. In
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Figure 4: Confusion matrix for Wednesday Security Intrusion Detection in CICIDS2017 Dataset
addition, this plot shows which method has less variation. For instance, the Kuiper distance and WD have the best
performance while Chernoff has the least performance.
Thursday Attack: This attack occurred on Thursday, July 6, 2017, and various attacks, such as the Web Attack – Brute
Force (9:20 – 10 a.m.), Web Attack – XSS (10:15 – 10:35 a.m.), and Web Attack – Sql Injection (10:40 – 10:42 a.m.)
have been recorded. Figure 6 shows the confusion matrix for Thursday morning’s security intrusion in the CICIDS2017
dataset when the Naive Bayes classifier is applied. Similar to Wednesday, 70 percent hold-out cross validation is used
for this dataset. As can be seen, this dataset has four classes and the classifier has problem to detect the last class or last
type of intrusion.
Figure 7 shows a sample result of six statistical measures (Chern-off and five ECDF-based measures) vs. accuracy of
the classifier. In this sample, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Kuiper measures have better performance.
Similar to the previous example, Figure 7 has been generated over 100 times and the box plot of Figure 8 can be seen.
In this figure, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Kuiper and Wassertein distance measures have a better performance, however,
their decision variance is a bit high.
The rest of results for Security Intrusion Detection in CICIDS2017 dataset are available in the SafeML Github
Repository.
4.3 Correlation Analysis
Figure 9 shows Pearson’s correlation between the classes of Wednesday’s data and the statistical ECDF-based distances.
As can be seen, the WD and WAD distances have more correlation with the classes. This figure also shows the
correlation between the measures themselves. The KSD and KD appear to be correlated. The WD and WAS also seem
to be correlated. These correlations can be explained due to the similarity in their formulation. P-values for the above
correlations were evaluated to be zero, thereby validating the correlation hypotheses above.
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Figure 5: Box plot of statistical distance measures vs. accuracy over 100 iterations
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Figure 6: Confusion matrix for Thursday Security Intrusion Detection in CICIDS2017 dataset
5 Towards Explainable AI
In this section, we discuss a relevant topic to our proposed approach, to explain how the proposed approach could
be applied for this purpose as well. Explainable AI (XAI) can be defined as a tool or framework that increases
interpretability of ML algorithms and their outputs [24]. Our proposed approach can also be used to improve the
interpretability of ML classifiers using the statistical ECDF-based distance measures seen previously. We shall discuss
a small example here and intend to delve further on this topic in our future works. For the example, the Wednesday data
from the security dataset mentioned previously is chosen and its class labels vs. the sample time has been plotted in
Figure 10. This dataset has six different classes with variable number of occurrence. In this figure a sliding window
with the size of d = 1500 is used. In the beginning, 1500 samples of class one are considered as reference and then
compared with the rest of the samples for each window using the statistical ECDF-based distance measures. It should
be mentioned that the smoothness of the output is related to the sliding window’s size. As can be see in the figure,
the change in the average distance vs. the class shows the existing high correlation. In addition, it seems that class
number five is slightly robust to statistical change and class number six has a low number of samples, that cannot
produce meaningful statistical difference. The problem of detecting class six can be solved by decreasing the size of the
sliding window.This figure can be generated for different classifiers and show how their decisions are correlated to
the ECDF-based distance measures. As an future work, we aim to investigate ECDF-based distance inside different
algorithms to better understand their actions. This section is just a hint for future works.
6 Discussion
Overall, our preliminary investigation indicates that statistical distance measures offer the potential for providing
a suitable indicator for ML performance, specifically for accuracy estimation. In particular, we further denote the
following capabilities and limitations for the proposed approach.
6.1 Capabilities of SafeML
• By modifying the existing statistical distance and error bound measures, the proposed method enables
estimation of the accuracy bound of the trained ML algorithm in the field with no label on the incoming data.
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Figure 7: Sample statistical distance measures vs. accuracy for Thursday Security Intrusion Detection in CICIDS2017
dataset
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Figure 8: Box plot of statistical distance measures vs. accuracy over 100 iterations for Thursday Security Intrusion
Detection in CICIDS2017 dataset
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Figure 9: Correlation between class label numbers and statistical ECDF-based Distance Measures
• A novel human-in-loop monitoring procedure is proposed to certify the ML algorithm during operation. The
procedure has three levels of operation: I) nominal operation allowed with assured ML-accuracy based on
the distance estimation, II) buffering data samples to generate estimation, and III) low estimated accuracy
estimated, leading to external intervention by automated/human controller being needed.
• The proposed approach is easy to implement, and can support a variety of distributions (i.e. exponential and
normal distribution families).
• The outcome of the proposed approach can be used as an input for runtime safety analysis in adaptive systems
[28, 29]
6.2 Limitations of the proposed method
• The proposed algorithm is currently only tackling the safety evaluation problem of the machine-learning-based
classification. However, we believe it can be easily expanded for clustering, dimension reduction or any
problem that can be evaluated through statistical difference.
• Some of the machine learning algorithms can be robust to a certain distributional shift or variation in the
dataset distribution. This may limit the effectiveness of the discussed distance measures. That being said, the
proposed measures can then be used as additional confirmation of the robustness, contributing to certification
arguments.
7 Conclusion
The expansion of ML applications to safety-critical domains is a major research question. We investigate the problem
of context applicability of an ML classifier, specifically the distributional shift between its training and observed
data. We have identified and evaluated sets of statistical distance measures that can provide estimated upper error
bounds in classification tasks based on the training and observed data distance. Further, we have proposed how this
approach can be used as part of safety and security-critical systems to provide active monitoring and thus improve
their robustness. The overall most effective distance measure was identified to be the Kolmogorov-Smirnov. The
proposed human-in-the-loop procedure uses this statistical distance measure to monitor the estimated accuracy of the
ML component and notify its AI or human controller when the deviation exceeds specific boundaries. The study is still
in its early stages, but we believe the results to offer a promising starting point. The strengths and weaknesses of the
proposed approach are discussed in the previous section.
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Figure 10: Plot of class label and statistical ECDF-based Distances vs. time (Security dataset: Wednesday)
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